Community packages (AUR): checking and sandbox
lux install <name> uses the community source (AUR) only when the name is not in the LuxOS and
Arch Linux repositories, the LuxOS .lux apps or Flathub (order in
package-management.md). AUR build scripts are written by other users and
are not checked by LuxOS, so lux checks them itself and builds them isolated by default.
Checking, sandbox and system installs
- Before building, the PKGBUILD,
.installfiles and every other file in the repository are checked in two layers: 1. Fixed rules (offline, deterministic): downloading and running code (curl | sh, download straight into$pkgdir, download to/tmp+chmod +x), hidden payloads (base64/hex, text reversed withrev,evalof fetched text), writes outside$pkgdir, touching accounts/sudo/SSH, persistence (.bashrc, per-user autostart/systemd unit),/etc/hosts,resolv.conf,ld.so.preload, sudoers/SUID, disabling the firewall or a security service, replacing a system binary, data upload / credential, cookie or SSH-key theft, cryptominer names, sources from a bare IP or look-alike host, missing checksums (SKIP) on a remote download, symbolic links pointing outside the package, plain-HTTP sources. Ahighfinding is by itself a dangerous verdict, even if the AI disagrees (this also blocks prompt-injection in the files). 2. Two independent AI models when you are signed in to LuxAI: Lite and Flash (strong on security). The stricter answer wins and a verdict is "safe" only if both models agree; the files are sent as untrusted data and instructions hidden inside them are ignored. Only the repository text is sent, never your files. - Verdict is safe / suspicious / dangerous, always with reasons (including why something looks
safe). Without LuxAI the verdict is "not checked" (
unreviewed) — never silently "safe". - Measured detection (49-sample evaluation: 22 real AUR packages + 27 synthetic malicious
variants, built-in corpus in
lux/tests/fixtures/aur-eval): the full review flagged 27/27 malicious as dangerous (0 rated safe); of the 22 real packages 18 were safe and 4 were "suspicious" (needing confirmation), 0 benign rated dangerous. The offline fixed rules alone flagged all 27 malicious atmediumor higher with nohighfinding on a benign package. - Default target: your sandbox (sandbox.md). lux copies the checked directory into
the sandbox (
luxos-sandbox build-install), installsbase-devel/dependencies there, runsmakepkginside as the sandbox user and installs the result with the sandbox's ownpacman. The build script never runs on your system. lux then says how to start it: a command-line tool by its own name (pi– a wrapper at the end ofPATH, a system program of the same name wins), an app with a window from Launchpad as "<App> (Sandbox)"; see sandbox.md. Sandbox apps cannot see your files – to use a tool with them, install it withlux install --system <name>.lux remove <name>removes it from the sandbox again. - Into the system only with explicit permission:
--system, or choose "2 System" and type the wordsystem. A dangerous script is never installed into the system; an unchecked or suspicious one only after you confirm without-y. System builds usemakepkg -si(jq,git,base-develare offered), sources in~/.cache/lux/aur/<pkgbase>. lux updaterebuilds newer versions of community packages already in the system and checks the new build script again (not as root, not with--repo).- LuxAI never installs community packages: lux refuses them when run by the LuxAI agent
(
LUXAI_AGENT=1) and LuxAI tells you to runlux install <name>yourself. - Hardware drivers people need (printers, scanners) are verified and shipped in the LuxOS repository instead — see drivers.md.